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Trust and betrayal of trust are ubiquitous in human
societies. Recent behavioral evidence shows that
the neuropeptide oxytocin increases trust among
humans, thus offering a unique chance of gaining
a deeper understanding of the neural mechanisms
underlying trust and the adaptation to breach of trust.
We examined the neural circuitry of trusting behavior
by combining the intranasal, double-blind, adminis-
tration of oxytocin with fMRI. We find that subjects
in the oxytocin group showno change in their trusting
behavior after they learned that their trust had been
breached several times while subjects receiving pla-
cebo decrease their trust. This difference in trust
adaptation is associated with a specific reduction in
activation in the amygdala, the midbrain regions,
and the dorsal striatum in subjects receiving oxyto-
cin, suggesting that neural systems mediating fear
processing (amygdala andmidbrain regions) and be-
havioral adaptations to feedback information (dorsal
striatum) modulate oxytocin’s effect on trust. These
findings may help to develop deeper insights into
mental disorders such as social phobia and autism,
which are characterized by persistent fear or avoid-
ance of social interactions.
INTRODUCTION
In nonhuman mammals the neuropeptide oxytocin (OT) plays
a central role in the ability to form social attachments and affilia-
tions, including parental care, pair bonding, and social memory
(Carter, 1998, 2003; Ferguson et al., 2002; Insel and Young,
2001; Lim and Young, 2006; Young andWang, 2004). In addition,
OT shows significant binding in the limbic system, including the
amygdala (Huber et al., 2005; Landgraf and Neumann, 2004)
and decreases stress responses and anxiety in social interac-
tions (Bale et al., 2001; Neumann et al., 2000; Parker et al.,
2005; Uvnas-Moberg, 1998a, 1998b). Initial behavioral experi-
ments indicate that OT also seems to be a potent modulator ofsocial interaction behavior and social cognition in humans (Bartz
andHollander,2006;HeinrichsandDomes, 2008).OThas recently
been shown to influence a person’s ability to infer another’smen-
tal state, an ability that is referred to as ‘‘mind-reading’’ (Domes
et al., 2007b). Moreover, a recent study has shown that OT
increases people’s willingness to trust others (Kosfeld et al.,
2005). Interestingly, OT’s effect on trust was not due to a general
increase in the readiness to bear risks. Instead,OTspecifically af-
fected individuals’ willingness to take social risks arising through
interpersonal interactions. The behavioral impact of OT on trust
offers a unique chance to gain a deeper understanding into the
neural circuitry of trust and trust adaptation after betrayal of trust
by combining behavioral experiments with pharmacological
intervention and neuroimaging methods. To date, however, no
study on the effects of this peptide on the neural circuitry associ-
ated with human trusting behavior is available. Moreover, it is not
known how OT affects trust after subjects experienced that their
trust had been betrayed, i.e., we do not know whether subjects
receiving OT respond to this betrayal with a decrease in trust or
whether they maintain their trusting behavior. We thus examined
the effects of intranasally administered OT on both brain activity
and individuals’ decisions in a trust anda risk gamewith realmon-
etary stakes after subjects received feedback indicating that their
trust had been betrayed or that their risky investment resulted in
no payback in about half the cases.
Our work is based on the combination of neuroscientific tools
with economic experiments which recently gained momentum
through the neuroeconomics research agenda (Camerer et al.,
2005; Cohen and Blum, 2002; De Quervain et al., 2004; Delgado
et al., 2004; Fehr and Camerer, 2007; Glimcher, 2002; Glimcher
and Rustichini, 2004; Hsu et al., 2005; King-Casas et al., 2005;
Knoch et al., 2006; Knutson et al., 2007; Kuhnen and Knutson,
2005; Montague and Berns, 2002; Sanfey et al., 2003; Spitzer
et al., 2007). We apply, in particular, a suitably modified version
of the trust game (Berg et al., 1995; Camerer and Weigelt, 1988;
Fehr et al., 1993) to address our research questions. In a trust
game (Figure 1), two subjects interacting anonymously are in
the role of an investor (who is in the scanner) and a trustee.
The investor first has the chance of choosing a costly trusting
action by giving money to the trustee. If the investor transfers
money, the total amount available for distribution between the
two players increases because the experimenter triples the
investor’s transfer. Initially, however, the trustee reaps the wholeNeuron 58, 639–650, May 22, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 639
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At the beginning of each new trust period, investor
and trustee receive an initial endowment of 12
money units (MUs). The investor then can decide
to keep all MUs or to send 4, 8, or 12 MUs to the
trustee. The experimenter triples the transferred
money. The trustee then has the option of keeping
the whole amount he received or sending back
a payoff equalizing amount of money. For exam-
ple, if the investor sends8MUs, the trustee receives
24 MUs, giving him in total 36 MUs (12 MUs own
endowment + 24 MUs tripled transfer) while the
investor has only 4 MUs at this stage of the
game. Then the trustee can chose a back transfer
of zero or a back transfer of 16 MUs. The experi-
menter does not triple the back transfer. Thus, if the trustee chooses a back transfer of zero MUs, he earns 36 MUs in the current period, while the investor
only earns 4 MUs. If the trustee, however, chooses a back transfer of 16 MUs, both players end up with the same total amount of 20 MUs. In the risk game
the investor faced the same investment opportunities as in the trust game, i.e., he could invest 0, 4, 8, or 12 MUs, and for every positive investment the computer
chooses a zero investment return or a return equal to that which could be achieved in the trust game. The investment returns were drawn randomly from the
probability distribution generated by the trustees’ behavior in the trust game. Thus, investors in the trust and the risk game faced the same objective risk, but
no social betrayal could occur in the risk game because no trustees were involved in the back transfers.increase. Then the trustee is informed about the investor’s trans-
fer and can then honor the investor’s trust by sending back
money (‘‘sharing’’), so that both subjects earn the same amount
of money. Thus, if the investor givesmoney to the trustee and the
latter shares, both players end up with a higher and equal mon-
etary payoff. However, the trustee also has the option of violating
the investor’s trust by not sharing the money. In this case, the in-
vestor loses all the money he sent to the trustee, an event that
investors typically interpret as a breach or betrayal of trust (Boh-
net and Zeckhauser, 2004). Since sharing the money is costly for
the trustee, a selfish trustee will never honor the investor’s trust
because the investor and the trustee interact only once in the
experiment.
In the risk (lottery) game, the investor faces the same choices
and exactly the same probabilistic risk as in the trust game, but
a random computer mechanism implements the payback and no
interaction with a trustee takes place. Thus, the only difference
between the two games is that the investor’s risk in the trust
game arises from the uncertainty regarding the trustee’s behav-
ior—that is, a social interaction with a specific trustee constitutes
the risk—whereas a nonsocial random mechanism determines
the investor’s risk in the lottery game. The risk game constitutes
an important control condition because economic theories (Falk
and Fischbacher, 2006; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Rabin, 1993)
and previous empirical research (Bohnet and Zeckhauser,
2004) has shown that many people have an aversion against
being betrayed when they trust another person (Bohnet and
Zeckhauser, 2004), but betrayal aversion cannot play a role in sit-
uations involving nonsocial risks. In addition, OT has been shown
to increase trust but not nonsocial risk taking, suggesting the
conjecture that OT reduces the special fears that are associated
with social betrayal (Kosfeld et al., 2005). Therefore, OT may
affect brain activity in these two games differently.
An investor either received OT or placebo. We had a total of 49
investors, each of whom played 12 risk periods (games) and 12
trust periods (games) that took place in a random order. The in-
vestor faced a new trustee in every trust period. Figure 2 depicts
a timeline for one period of a trust and a lottery game for subjects640 Neuron 58, 639–650, May 22, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.in the scanner. After the first 12 periods, in which six risk games
and six trust games took place, the investors received feedback
that informed them how often their investment was successful in
the risk game and how often the trustee paid back money in the
trust game. Thus, the investors received feedback only once—at
the end of the first 12 periods. The feedback information told the
investors that their investment led to a return or their trust was
repaid only in about 50% of the cases (see Figure 2 and Exper-
imental Procedures section for detailed description of feedback
administration). In the following, we refer to the first six risk and
six trust games as the prefeedback phase, while the periods after
the feedback are referred to as the postfeedback phase. Taken
together our experimental design creates thus three main vari-
ables: group (OT, placebo), phase (prefeedback, postfeedback),
and game (trust, risk).
Previous findings from neuroimaging and lesion studies led us
to hypothesize that subcortical brain structures such as the
amygdala and brainstem effector sites—that process fear, dan-
ger, and perhaps also risk of social betrayal—are involved in
trusting behaviors. The amygdala has been shown to exhibit in-
creased activation in social avoidance and phobia (Stein et al.,
2002; Tillfors et al., 2001) and while viewing untrustworthy faces
(Winston et al., 2002). Decreased amygdala activation has also
been linked to genetic hypersociability (Meyer-Lindenberg
et al., 2005), and lesion studies have indicated that patients
with bilateral amygdala damage are impaired in judging the trust-
worthiness of other people’s faces. These patients all judged
other people to look more trustworthy and more approachable
than did normal viewers (Adolphs et al., 1998). Finally, during
the processing of fearful stimuli, subjects receiving OT have
reduced amygdala activation and reduced connectivity of the
amygdala with brainstem regions involved in automatic fear re-
activity (Domes et al., 2007a; Kirsch et al., 2005). This finding is
in agreement with a recent animal study that demonstrates
in vitro that OT acts on the central amygdala by inhibiting excit-
atory information from the amygdala to brainstem sites mediat-
ing the autonomic fear response (Huber et al., 2005). Given
that the amygdala is crucially involved in the processing of risks
Neuron
Oxytocin Shapes the Neural Circuitry of TrustFigure 2. Timeline for Trust and Lottery Periods
Timeline for one period of the trust (top) and lottery game (bottom) for the investor (Player A) whose brain was observed in the scanner. A total of 12 trust and 12
lottery periods were played. At the beginning of each new period, a decision screen indicated whether a trust or lottery period will be played. The ‘‘trust screen’’
depicted a schematic picture of a human being while the ‘‘lottery screen’’ depicted a schematic picture of a computer. After 4 s, four buttons representing the four
response options appeared on the screen, indicating that the subject now had 8 s to implement a decision. After the subjects made their choice, a fixation cross
appeared for 4 s, after which a screen indicated a waiting epoch of 8 s. During that time, the subjects in the scanner were informed that the trustees (Player B) are
now deciding or that the random mechanism determines the returns from the lottery. Finally, periods were separated by a screen depicting a fixation cross with
a variable duration of 10–12 s. Importantly, after half of the played trust and lottery periods, a feedback screen appeared for 25 s, consisting of meager feedback
indicating that only in about 50% of the cases the trustees shared the money or the lottery did yield a return, respectively.arising in social situations, we hypothesized that oxytocin might
affect the amygdala response to these social risks, thereby facil-
itating prosocial approach behavior—such as trust.
Other relevant evidence comes from neuroimaging studies
using economic experiments involving social interaction para-
digms (Delgado et al., 2005a; King-Casas et al., 2005; Rilling
et al., 2002). These studies suggest the striatum could play
a role in our experiment; it is thought to be part of a neural circuit
that guides and adjusts future behavior on the basis of reward
feedback (O’Doherty et al., 2004; Tricomi et al., 2004). Moreover,
a study of reward-related (nonsocial) probability learning has
shown that activation in this region in response to reward feed-
back diminishes, as cues learned through trial and error begin
to predict how actions and outcomes are related, thus making
feedback less informative (Delgado et al., 2005b). This finding
has been extended to a repeated-interaction trust game in which
participants faced the same opponent and gradually learned
whether their partner is trustworthy through experience. Over
time, as the partner’s response became more predictable, the
activity in the dorsal striatum decreased in this game (King-
Casas et al., 2005). Trial and error is not the sole method for
learning predictability, however. It has been recently shown
that the perceptions of moral character alone suffice tomodulatethe dorsal striatum during both the decision and the outcome
phases of a trust game (Delgado et al., 2005a). Participants
made risky choices about whether to trust hypothetical trading
partners after having read vivid descriptions of life events indi-
cating praiseworthy, neutral, or suspicious moral character. Ac-
tivations in the striatum differentiated between positive and neg-
ative feedback as well as between no-trust and trust decisions,
but only for the ‘‘neutral’’ partner, whereas no differential activity
was observed for the ‘‘good’’ partner despite the fact that (by
experimental design) neutral and good partners responded in
the same way to trusting decisions. This finding suggests that
prior social and moral information can diminish reliance on brain
structures such as the dorsal striatum that are important for
behavioral adaptations to feedback information. These brain
structures may also be recruited in our experiment as the sub-
jects may feel the need to adjust their behaviors following mea-
ger information feedback. Therefore, if OT indeed diminishes the
behavioral adaptation to this feedback, such an effect might be
modulated by a diminished reliance on brain structures involved
in behavioral adaptation.
Regarding the two different phases of the study (pre- and
postfeedback phase), it is important to note that subjects in
the prefeedback phase have an incentive to explore differentNeuron 58, 639–650, May 22, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 641
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Oxytocin Shapes the Neural Circuitry of TrustFigure 3. Investors’ Average Transfer in the
Risk and Trust Game across the Prefeed-
back and the Postfeedback Phases
Each data point represents the average over six
decision periods (please see Table S1 and
Figure S1 for SEM). The figure shows the interac-
tion effect in the trust game (group 3 phase:
F(1,40) = 4.06, p = 0.05, ETA
2 = 0.11), indicating
a differential adaptation in trusting behavior after
the meager feedback in the OT (red color) com-
pared to the placebo group (green color). While
subjects receiving OT demonstrate no significant
change in their trusting behavior, subjects receiv-
ing the placebo decrease theirs. In contrast,
subjects receiving OT and the placebo respond
in the same way to the feedback in the risk game
by keeping their investments almost constant.strategies in order to maximize the informativeness of the feed-
back. In order to maximize learning about the trustworthiness
of the trustees’ subject pool, for example, the investors may
have an incentive to make more trusting decisions in the pre-
feedback phase because the gleaned knowledge about the
trustees’ trustworthiness can be valuable for behavioral adapta-
tion after the feedback. An additional motive for trusting choices
in the prefeedback phase thus exists that is absent in the
postfeedback phase. Note too that in order to enable a clean
comparison between the two games in the postfeedback phase,
subjects received the same feedback in the risk and the trust
game because the probability distribution of investment suc-
cesses in the risk game replicated the probability distribution
of the trustees’ responses in the trust game (see Experimental
Procedures section for details).
RESULTS
Behavioral Results
Our main behavioral measure consists of each individual’s
average investment in the risk and the trust game during the
prefeedback and the postfeedback phase, yielding four obser-
vations per individual. We performed a two-way repeated-mea-
sures ANOVA based on these observations for the risk and the
trust game (controlling for potential personality differences in
general trust [M. Siegrist, C. Keller, T.C. Earle, and M. Hansel-
mann, personal communication], general risk seeking propensity
[Zuckerman and Link, 1968], and feedback information; see
Experimental Procedures section for details). This analysis re-
veals a significant interaction effect in the trust game (group 3
phase, F(1,40) = 4.06, p = 0.05, ETA
2 = 0.11), which is absent in the
risk game (group 3 phase, F(1,40) = 0.04, p = 0.85, ETA
2 = 0.001).
Subjects receiving the placebo decreased their trusting behavior
after they were informed that their interaction partner did not pay
back in about 50% of the cases, whereas subjects receiving OT
demonstrated no change in their trusting behavior in the post-
feedback phase (see Figure 3 and see Table S1 available online)
despite having received the same information. In the risk game,
however, both groups showed no behavioral adaptation to the
feedback information. Thus, it seems that OT only affects the
behavioral adaptation to the feedback information if social risks
are involved, but not if nonsocial risks are involved.642 Neuron 58, 639–650, May 22, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.The specific impact of OT on behavioral adaptation in the trust
but not in the risk game is complemented by similarly specific re-
sponse time differences between the OT and placebo group. In-
dividuals in the OT group exhibit considerably smaller response
times than those in the placebo group (t =2.77, p < 0.01) during
the postfeedback phase, whereas no significant differences (t =
0.51, p = 0.61) are present during the prefeedback phase (see
Table S2). This difference in the postfeedback phase is, in partic-
ular, due to the significant decline in responses times in the OT
group in the postfeedback phase compared to the prefeedback
phase (t = 2.72, p < 0.05). The response time effect of OT in the
trust game contrasts with the risk game, in which we observe no
significant differences between the two groups in the prefeed-
back and in the postfeedback phase.
In order to control for nonspecific effects that might be asso-
ciated with OT administration, we explicitly measured mood,
calmness, and wakefulness before substance administration
and 10 min after the end of the scanning session (after subjects
had played both the risk and trust game). We observed no signif-
icant group differences (independent t tests, all p > 0.26; see
Table S3) neither before the scanning session nor afterwards.
Finally, we asked subjects at the end of the experiment whether
they believed they had received OT or the placebo. Thirty-four
percent of subjects in the placebo group and 30% of subjects
in the OT group reported the impression they had received OT.
A correlation between this belief question and the effective
administration of OT or the placebo showed no significant corre-
lation (Spearman correlation, r = 0.107, p = 0.470), thus clearly
indicating that neither subjects in theOT nor in the placebo group
recognized whether they had received OT or a placebo.
Neuroimaging Results
We conducted analyses of functional magnetic resonance imag-
ing (fMRI) data for the decision phase of the trust and the risk
game. A random-effects general linear model (GLM) analysis
was conducted using each condition (trust and risk game) and
period (six prefeedback periods and six postfeedback periods)
as predictors. We generated statistical maps contrasting the
OT and the placebo groups using serial subtraction terms, sep-
arately for prefeedback and postfeedback periods. The serial
subtraction term consisted either of trust > risk contrasts or
risk > trust contrasts and was exclusively masked at p < 0.05
Neuron
Oxytocin Shapes the Neural Circuitry of TrustFigure 4. Brain Regions Showing Stronger
Activation in the Placebo Compared to the
Oxytocin Group
Depicted on sagittal or coronal slices is the in-
creased activation in the placebo compared to
the oxytocin group in trust periods played (A) pre-
feedback (including ACC) and (B) postfeedback
(including bilateral amygdala, bilateral caudate
nucleus and midbrain brain regions). All regions
are significant at p < 0.005 with a cluster extent
of ten voxels. However, for display purposes all re-
gions are depicted at p < 0.01. Bar plots represent
differences in contrast estimates (trust > risk) of
functional ROI’s (see Experimental Procedures
section for details) for bilateral amygdala, right
caudatus, midbrain regions and ACC, broken
down for the oxytocin (in red color) and placebo
group (in green color) as well as time phase
(prefeedback/postfeedback). Univariate and re-
peated-measures ANOVAs calculated with and
without control for potentially confounding vari-
ables (including general trust, sensation seeking,
first feedback) confirmed for each depicted brain
regions the interaction effect of group 3 phase,
qualified by stronger activation in these brain re-
gions in the placebo compared to the oxytocin
group either only in prefeedback or only in post-
feedback periods.with the reversed second contrast of the serial subtraction term
(see Experimental Procedures section for explanation). For ex-
ample, one important statistical map in the postfeedback phase
concerns (Trust > Risk)P > (Trust > Risk)OT, exclusively masked
with the reverse second contrast (Risk > Trust)OT. Here, OT de-
notes oxytocin and P indicates placebo. The results of this
map reveal the brain activations that are specific to trust taking
(relative to risk taking) in the placebo (P) group, i.e., the extent
to which OT reduces brain activations when individuals make
choices in the trust game. Significant results are reported at
p < 0.005 (uncorrected) with a cluster threshold of ten voxels.
In case of significant unilateral activations in our main regions
of interests, including the amygdala and striatum, we lowered
the significance threshold to p < 0.01 (uncorrected) with the
same voxel extent to verify whether a bilateral activation pattern
could be found at this threshold.
Prefeedback Periods
A few differences were observed between the OT and placebo
group during the decision phase of prefeedback periods, both
in the trust and risk game. The OT group showed stronger acti-
vation of the thalamus (x = 15, y = 27, z = 6), whereas the pla-
cebo group demonstrated increased activation in the dorsal part
of the ACC (x = 6, y = 24, z = 12; see Figure 4A) during prefeed-
back trust game periods (see Table 1). During the prefeedback
risk game, increased activation in the OT group was found in
the inferior temporal gyrus (x = 39, y = 54, z = 15), whereas
the placebo group showed a relative increase of activation in
parietal brain regions (precuneus/posterior cingulate, x = 15,
y = 60, z = 21; superior parietal gyrus, x = 30, y = 60, z =
48). We will discuss these prefeedback activations in the Risk
> Trust contrast in the Supplemental Data (SupplementalDiscussion) because in the main text we are mainly interested
in the Trust > Risk contrasts.
Postfeedback Periods
As hypothesized, the placebo group showed stronger activation
in postfeedback trust game periods in the bilateral amygdala
(x = 30, y = 3, z =18; x =24, y = 0, z =21), bilateral caudatus
(x = 12, y = 6, z = 9; x =9, y = 0, z = 12), midbrain regions (x =3,
y =24, z =3), as well as arousal related structures such as the
posterior insula (x = 33, y = 21, z = 0) and postcentral gyrus
(x =27, y =54, z = 69; see Table 2 and Figure 4B). In contrast,
not a single brain region showed group differences during the
postfeedback risk game. Moreover, no brain region showed an
activation increase in the OT compared to the placebo group
during the postfeedback trust game.
ROI Analyses for Prefeedback
and Postfeedback Periods
For all brain regions showing differing group activation either
prefeedback or postfeedback (see Tables 1 and 2), we created
combined functional and structural (based on the anatomic atlas
by Tzourio-Mazoyer et al. [2002]) ROIs and calculated repeated-
measures ANOVAs using participants’ beta weights (for details
see Experimental Procedures section). These analyses allow
a deeper examination of (1) the lateralization pattern in the amyg-
dala and the caudatus, (2) the effect of the prefeedback and the
postfeedback phase on activation patterns in all brain regions, as
well as (3) the influence on brain activation of the potentially
confounding variables used in the behavioral analysis (including
general trust [M. Siegrist, C. Keller, T.C. Earle, and M. Hansel-
mann, personal communication], sensation seeking [Zuckerman
and Link, 1968], and feedback information; see ExperimentalNeuron 58, 639–650, May 22, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 643
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Oxytocin Shapes the Neural Circuitry of TrustTable 1. Brain Activation Differences between Oxytocin and Placebo in Prefeedback Game Periods
Condition Contrasts Brain Regions BA Side x y z Max t Score Voxels
Risk Game Oxytocin > placebo
(R-T)OT – (R-T)P
Temporal Lobe
Inferior temporal gyrus 37 R 39 54 15 3.16 * 14
Placebo > oxytocin
(R-T)P – (R-T)OT
Parietal Lobe
Precuneus/posterior
cingulum
31 L 15 60 21 3.09 * 11
Superior parietal gyrus 7 R 30 60 48 3.08 * 21
Trust Game Oxytocin > placebo
(T-R)OT – (T-R)P
Subcortical Structures
Thalamus, pulvinar R 15 27 6 3.53 *** 13
Placebo > oxytocin
(T-R)P – (T-R)OT
Frontal Lobe
ACC 24 R 6 24 12 3.18 ** 20
 ACC 24 R 15 33 9 2.83 *
The coordinates of activated brain regions are given according to theMNI space together with the t scores and significance thresholds (*p < 0.005, **p <
0.001, ***p < 0.0005, uncorrected for multiple comparisons). R denotes risk game, T denotes trust game, OT denotes oxytocin and P denotes placebo.
Minimum cluster size ten voxels. All observedmaxima are reported.  indicates a subpeak in the same cluster of voxels. All serial contrasts are masked
exclusively at p < 0.05 using the reversed second contrast of the serial subtraction term. Regions of interest discussed in the paper are italic.Procedures section). These ANOVAs confirm the previously
reported results in Tables 1 and 2. In particular, we find a robust
interaction effect between Group and Time Phase in bilateral
amygdala and the right caudatus indicating that subjects in the
placebo group only show higher activations in these brain
regions in the postfeedback phase of the trust game, where
we observe the differences in behavioral adaptation across the
OT and the placebo group (see Tables S5 and S6 for detailed
information). This interaction between Group and Time Phase
is also present if we control for potentially confounding variables,
such as personality differences in general trust, sensation seek-
ing, or mood; if we do not control for these differences then the
interaction effect is also obtained in the leftCaudatus. Finally, we
calculated univariate ANOVAs to control for response time differ-
ences between the OT and placebo group observed in postfeed-
back periods. There was no effect of response times on the brain
activation patterns in these analyses (see Table S7).
DISCUSSION
This is the first study showing how OT affects humans’ behav-
ioral adaptation to meager feedback information about the suc-
cess of previous trust and risk taking. Our results indicate that
intranasally administered OT indeed affects these behavioral ad-
aptations in a specific way. If subjects face the nonsocial risks in
the risk game, OT does not affect their behavioral responses to
the feedback. Both subjects in the OT group and the placebo
group do not change their willingness to take risks after the feed-
back. In contrast, if subjects face social risks, such as in the trust
game, thosewho received placebo respond to the feedbackwith
a decrease in trusting behavior while subjects with OT demon-
strate no change in their trusting behavior although they were
informed that their interaction partners did not honor their trust
in roughly 50% of the cases.
These behavioral findings are consistent with the hypothesis
that betrayal aversion is operative in the trust game (Bohnet
and Zeckhauser, 2004) and that OT contributes to a reduction
in the fear of social betrayal (Kosfeld et al., 2005). Subjects in644 Neuron 58, 639–650, May 22, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.the risk game need not fear that another individual will breach
their trust because they only face the probabilistic risk arising
from a preprogrammed computer, i.e., betrayal aversion could
play no role in the risk game. In contrast, subjects face a human
partner in the trust game who has the option of abusing their
trust. The response time differences between the OT and the
placebo group during the postfeedback phase also support
this interpretation. Subjects in the OT group need significantly
less time to make a trusting decision, consistent with the view
that it is easier for them to overcome the trust-inhibiting force
of betrayal aversion.
Our findings also conformwith both animal and human studies
showing that OT ameliorates the symptoms associated with
social anxiety and stress (Heinrichs et al., 2003; Heinrichs and
Domes, 2008; Insel and Young, 2001). We suggest that future
studies could systematically manipulate feedback information
to examine whether OT reduces reliance on feedback mecha-
nism and thus increases trusting behavior regardless of how
negative the feedback information is or whether extremely
negative feedback information (e.g., reinforcement rates below
20 percent) will diminish or even abolish OT’s effect on behav-
ioral adaptation in situations requiring trust.
The finding that OT had no behavioral impact on trusting
behavior in prefeedback periods might seem surprising at first.
However, we already pointed out that subjects faced additional
incentives to transfer money to the trustees in the prefeedback
periods because they knew they would receive feedback. The
only way to learn about the degree of trustworthiness in the
population of trustees is to transfer money to them. If OT indeed
reduces betrayal aversion, the incentive to explore the trustees’
trustworthiness must obviously be weaker in the OT group than
in the placebo group because subjects with OT are less afraid of
betrayal. Thus, the placebo group has a stronger reason for ex-
tracting information from the feedback, implying that they also
transfer more money relative to their natural inclination to trust.
If placebo subjects experience this conflict between their natural
inclination to trust and the incentive to explore their partners’
trustworthiness, the brain should then represent this conflict. In
Neuron
Oxytocin Shapes the Neural Circuitry of TrustTable 2. Brain Activation Differences between Oxytocin and Placebo in Postfeedback Game Periods
Condition Contrast Brain Regions BA Side x y z Max t Score Voxels
Risk game Oxytocin > placebo
(R-T)OT – (R-T)P
No suprathreshold clusters
Placebo > oxytocin
(R-T)P – (R-T)OT
No suprathreshold clusters
Trust game Oxytocin > placebo
(T-R)OT – (T-R)P
No suprathreshold clusters
Placebo > oxytocin
(T-R)P – (T-R)OT
Temporal Lobe
Amygdala R 30 3 18 3.06 * 12
Amygdala L 24 0 21 3.12 * 14
 Amygdala L 27 0 12 2.48 
Parietal Lobe
Postcentral Gyrus 5 L 27 54 69 2.96 * 10
Subcortical Structures
Putamen/insula L 33 21 0 3.15 * 11
Caudate body R 12 6 9 3.08 * 16
 Caudate body R 12 3 18 2.88 *
 Caudate head R 9 9 0 2.87 *
Caudate body L 9 0 12 2.76  10
Brainstem, midbrain,
red nucleus
L 3 24 3 3.03 * 11
The coordinates are given according to the MNI space together with its t scores and significant thresholds (p < 0.01, *p < 0.005, **p < 0.001, ***p <
0.0005 [all uncorrected formultiple comparisons]). R denotes risk game, T denotes trust game, OT denotes oxytocin, and P denotes placebo.Minimum
cluster size 10 voxels.  indicates a subpeak in the same cluster of voxels. All observedmaxima are reported. All serial contrasts aremasked exclusively
at p < 0.05 using the reversed second contrast of the serial subtraction term. Regions of interests discussed in the paper are italic.this context, it is therefore interesting to observe that the placebo
subjects in the trust game exhibit higher activation in the dorsal
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), a brain region frequently impli-
cated in conflict monitoring and cognitive control in social
(Delgado et al., 2005a; Sanfey et al., 2003) and nonsocial para-
digms (Botvinick et al., 1999; Carter et al., 1998). In fact, the dor-
sal ACC is the only brain region showing increased activation in
the placebo compared to the OT group during the prefeedback
periods of the trust game which strengthens our interpretation
of the behavioral finding.
The brain activations we find in the postfeedback phase (Table
2) are also very informative with regard to the neural networks in-
volved in the reduced behavioral adaptation to the meager feed-
back in the trust game and its absence in the risk game. There are
nodifferences in brain activationbetween theOTand theplacebo
group in the risk game, where we observe no behavioral differ-
ences. In contrast, as hypothesized, we find differences between
the placebo and the OT group in the amygdala, the midbrain, as
well as the striatum in postfeedback trust periods, i.e., exactly in
those periods in which we also observe differences in behavioral
adaptation to the feedback information.More precisely, the bilat-
eral amygdala and functionally connected brainstem effector
sites showed significantly increased activation in the placebo
compared to the OT group in postfeedback trust periods. A
vast area of research in animal, human lesion, and neuroimaging
studies points to the critical role of these brain areas in signaling
and modulating fear responses (Adolphs et al., 2005; Amaral,
2003). Moreover, both human neuroimaging (Domes et al.,2007a; Kirsch et al., 2005) and animal studies (Huber et al.,
2005) have shown that the neuropeptide OT decreases fear re-
sponses bymodulating activation in the amygdala and brainstem
effector sites. Finally, it has been reported that the amygdala
shows increased activation during viewing faces of people that
look untrustworthy (Winston et al., 2002) and that patients with
bilateral amygdala damage judged other people to look more
trustworthy and more approachable than did normal viewers or
other patients with brain damage in other areas (Adolphs et al.,
1998). Taken together, these findings are consistent with the
view that OT reduces fear responses during the trust game by
reducing activation in the amygdala and connected brainstem
effector sites, which in turn enhances subjects’ ability to trust in
situations characterized by the risk of betrayal.
Animal studies indicate that increased availability of OT in the
central nervous system facilitates approach behavior (affiliation
and social attachment) by modulating brain circuits such as
the nucleus accumbens (part of the striatum) and ventral pal-
lidum (Insel and Young, 2001; Young et al., 2001) that are impli-
cated in reward processing. In the light of these findings, it is
interesting that in our experiment, OT reduces activations in
a closely related striatal area—the caudate nucleus—in the trust
game. Neuroimaging studies (O’Doherty et al., 2004; Tricomi
et al., 2004) have shown that the caudate is critically involved
in feedback processing and reward learning associated with
behavioral adaptations to information about the action-outcome
contingencies, and several studies document (Delgado et al.,
2005b; King-Casas et al., 2005) that caudate activation isNeuron 58, 639–650, May 22, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 645
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ably predicted. Thus, once subjects in these studies have
learned the contingency between their actions and the associ-
ated outcomes, the caudate is less active. Moreover, a recent
neuroimaging study (Delgado et al., 2005a) of investor behavior
in the trust game has shown that themere perception of amorally
‘‘good’’ character and to a lesser extent of a morally ‘‘bad’’ char-
acter (implemented by the attribution of vivid descriptions of life
events—indicating morally good, neutral, or bad behaviors—to
the faces of three different partners) already diminishes activa-
tions in caudate nucleus during the initial stages of the trust
game. In contrast, the caudate is strongly activated during deci-
sion and outcome phases of the trust game when participants
faced a morally ‘‘neutral’’ partner. Despite equivalent reinforce-
ment rates (50%) for all three partners, subjects were more likely
to trust the ‘‘good’’ partner, even during the later periods of the
trust game. Thus, when playing with the ‘‘good’’ partner, sub-
jects behave as if they ‘‘know’’ that the ‘‘good’’ partner is more
trustworthy, i.e., they exhibit less behavioral adaptation to the
same feedback information, and this lack of reliance on the feed-
back information is associated with less caudate activation.
It is interesting that OT administration and the explicit knowl-
edge of facing a morally ‘‘good’’ partner both generate similar
behavioral patterns and neural responses in the caudate nu-
cleus. Recall, we also find less behavioral adaptation to feed-
back information in subjects with OT and—like in the other study
(Delgado et al., 2005a)—this behavioral pattern is associated
with diminished caudate activation. Thus, subjects with OT be-
have as if they implicitly ‘‘know’’ that they can trust their partners,
and this may be the reason why the brain structure that is critical
for learning the contingency between actions and outcomes—
the caudate nucleus—shows diminished activation.
It is also important to note that the effect of OT on trust
occurred without subjective awareness because subjects were
completely unaware whether they received OT. There was also
no difference in questionnaire measures of mood, calmness,
and wakefulness between the placebo and the OT subjects.
And finally, the differences in brain activation between placebo
and OT subjects were only observed in subcortical structures
as the amygdala, the midbrain, and the striatum. Those brain
structures have each been associated with automatic and intui-
tive (Bechara et al., 1997; McClure et al., 2004) or even uncon-
scious processes (Pasley et al., 2004). Various studies show
that amygdala activation is also seen when fearful facial expres-
sions of emotion are presented briefly and masked to prevent
conscious perception (Whalen et al., 1998) or when presented
in a cortically blind field (Morris et al., 2001; Pegna et al.,
2005). Thus, taken together, these findings suggest that OT ex-
erts its effect automatically or even unconsciously in subcortical
brain structures which can be modulated without explicit aware-
ness of the subjects.
Human societies are probably unique in the extent to which
trust characterizes interpersonal interactions. Trust is indispens-
able in friendship, love, families, and organizations, and it is a
lubricant of economic, political, and social exchange. However,
whenever we trust there is also the possibility of trust betrayal.
Despite the fact that most humans have experienced instances
of breach of trust, they still remain capable of trusting others.646 Neuron 58, 639–650, May 22, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.In this study, we examined the neural circuitry of trust after
breach of trust by studying how OT affects the behaviors and
the brain networks of subjects whose trust has been broken in
about 50% of the cases. OT significantly reduces subjects’ be-
havioral adaptation to such meager feedback information. This
behavioral effect is accompanied by a reduced activity in brain
areas known to be involved in fear processing (amygdala, mid-
brain) and behavioral adaptation (caudate nucleus) in situations
with unknown action-outcome contingencies. These effects of
OT on brain activations are highly specific in the sense that
they only occur when OT affects behavior. They are absent in
the risk game, where OT does not affect the behavioral adapta-
tion to the same feedback information.
Finally, our insights into the neural circuitry of trust adaptation,
and oxytocin’s role in trust adaptation, may also contribute to
a deeper understanding of mental disorders such as social pho-
bia or autism that are associated with social deficits. In particu-
lar, social phobia (which is the third most common mental health
disorder) is characterized by persistent fear and avoidance of
social interactions. We hope that our results will lead to further
fertile research on such health disorders and the potential role
of possible dysfunctions in neuroendocrine mechanisms such
as the oxytocinergic system. Further progress in this area also
requires more detailed knowledge about the mechanism of
brain penetration of OT following different methods of adminis-
tration and the relationship between plasma and central OT, in-
cluding possible crosstalks of the neuropeptide at other central
receptors (Heinrichs and Domes, 2008).
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Subjects
A total of 49 healthy male students (mean age ± SD, 21.7 ± 2.5) from different
universities in Zurich participated in the study. One reason for taking only one
sex is that OTmay strongly vary across male and female subjects, which intro-
duces an additional source of noise. Subjects with chronic diseases, mental
disorders, medication, or those who smoked or abused drugs or alcohol
were excluded from the study. Participants abstained from food and drink
(other than water) for 2 hr before the experiment, and from exercise, caffeine,
and alcohol during the 24 hr before the session. In addition, we administered
the brief symptom inventory scales (BSI), brief psychological self-reports
that measure psychological symptoms; none of the subjects was in the clinical
range, and there were no significant differences between the placebo and OT
group in either scale (see Table S4). Participants were informed at the time of
recruitment that the experiment evaluates the effects of a hormone on decision
making. The study was carried out in accordance with the Declaration of Hel-
sinki principles and approved by the institutional ethics committee. All subjects
gave written, informed consent and were informed of their right to discontinue
participation at any time.
Substance Administration
Subjects were randomly assigned to the OT or placebo group (double-blind,
placebo-controlled study design). Recent research has shown that neuropep-
tides, such as vasopressin, gain access to the human brain after intranasal
administration (Born et al., 2002), providing a useful method for studying the
central nervous system effects of the neuropeptide oxytocin in humans (Hein-
richs and Gaab, 2007). As oxytocin and vasopressin are closely related struc-
turally, differing in only two amino acids, a pharmacokinetically similar mech-
anism regarding the pathway to the brain has been assumed for both peptides
(Bartz and Hollander, 2006; Heinrichs and Domes, 2008). Subjects received
a single dose of 24 IU OT (Syntocinon-Spray, Novartis; three puffs per nostril,
each with 4 IU OT) intranasally or a placebo 50 min before the start of the trust
Neuron
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than those caused by OT (e.g., olfactory effects), the placebo contained all
inactive ingredients except for the neuropeptide. Intranasal OT is widely pre-
scribed for lactating women and has been used in several experimental studies
in humans with no adverse side effects being reported (Heinrichs et al., 2003;
Heinrichs et al., 2004). Because of potential diurnal variations in endogenous
hormone secretion, we restricted the time of exogenous OT administration
to 2 p.m. to 4 p.m.
Design
In total, subjects played 12 rounds of a trust game against 12 different and
anonymous human interaction partners and 12 rounds of a risk game in which
a random mechanism determined the outcome of the game. The parameters
of the experiment were determined with the help of behavioral pilot experi-
ments. We wanted to ensure, in particular, that the trustees breach the inves-
tors’ trust in the trust game in about 50% of the cases, which we did by using
the trustees’ choices from the pilot experiment as an input (i.e., as responses
from the trustees) for the scanner experiment. Moreover, the computerized
responses to the investment decisions in the risk game were drawn from a dis-
tribution that perfectly mimics the distribution of the trustees’ choices in the
pilot experiment. In this way, we ensured that the investors in the risk and
the trust experiment received the same feedback. Trust and risk periods
were presented counterbalanced and pseudorandomized. Rudimentary feed-
back information consisting of a reinforcement rate of 50%was revealed to the
subjects in the scanner after half of the played trust and risk periods. In this
feedback, subjects received the following information separately for the risk
and trust game. First, they were informed in how many of six risk and six trust
periods they invested money (regardless of the amount). In addition, they were
told in howmany of these periods they received a back transfer. For example, if
the investor invested in four out of six periods in the trust game, he first was
reminded of his transfer behavior and then he received the feedback informa-
tion that a back transfer was executed in two out of the four periods in which he
invested. If the investor invested money in an even number of periods, the
reinforcement rate was exactly 50%. If money was invested in an odd number
of periods, for example, in only three periods of the trust game, a random de-
vice determined with 50% probability whether trust was repaid in one or two
out of the three trusting cases. This procedure ensures that the investor’s trust
was betrayed in about 50% of the cases (or that the investor’s investment
yielded a return in 50% of the cases in the risk game). After the feedback
had been presented, investors played another six trust periods against six
other human partners and six risk gameswithout getting feedback information.
Finally, they received detailed feedback information for each of the 12 trust and
12 risk periods at the end of the experiment.
Prior to scanning, subjects read written instructions describing the se-
quence of events, the payoff rules, details of the risk and the trust game,
and were informed that they would receive feedback after the first 12 periods
of a random sequence of trust and risk games. After the subjects had read the
instructions, we checked whether they understood the payoff rules, the treat-
ment conditions, andwhen theywould receive feedback information bymeans
of several hypothetical questions. All subjects answered the control questions
correctly. Thus, all subjects knew that the whole experiment would last for 24
periods and that they would receive feedback information after 12 periods.
Subjects received a lump sum payment of CHF 80 for participating in the
experiment plus the additional money earned during the 24 risk/trust periods
(exchange rate 5 money units = 1.- Swiss Franc; that is about $1.00). Subjects
earned on average about 140.- Swiss Francs in the experiment.
Procedure
The computer screens that the subjects needed to see during the 24 decision
trials were presented via a video projector onto a translucent screen that sub-
jects viewed inside the scanner via a mirror. At the beginning of each period,
the subjects were presented a fixation cross in the middle of the screen for
10 to 12 s (randomly jittered in the interval 10–12 s). The second screen in a
period showed the treatment condition, indicating either the beginning of
a trust period or a risk period for 4 s using a schematic picture of a human
or computer, respectively (see Figure 2). After 4 s, four buttons representing
the four response options were presented on the same screen, indicatingthat the subjects could now implement their decisions, with a time restriction
of 8 s, by means of a four-button input device. On average, decisions were
implemented 5.3 s (standard error, 0.103) after the treatment condition (either
a trust or a risk period) appeared on the screen. After the subjects had made
their decision, a fixation cross was presented for 4 s. After these 4 s, a fourth
screen indicated a waiting epoch for 8 s, during which the subjects in the
scanner received the information that the trustees are now deciding or that
the lotteries are now being played. As mentioned above, feedback information
was first shown after six risk and six trust periods had been played. After
subjects had finished all 12 risk and 12 trust periods they received rudimentary
feedback information for the postfeedback phase (i.e., for the 6 risk and
6 trust periods in that phase) and afterwards we gave them detailed feed-
back information for every of the 12 risk and 12 trust periods. The rudimentary
feedback info in the middle and at the end of the experiment was depicted
for 25 s each. The software package z-TREE (Fischbacher, 2007), a program
for conducting behavioral experiments in combination with neuroimaging,
was used for presenting screens and for collecting behavioral and timing
data.
Questionnaire Measures
To measure alterations in the psychological state of the subjects throughout
the course of the experiment, we assessed their mood, calmness, and wake-
fulness at the beginning of the experiment (before substance administration)
and after the scanning session, by means of a suitable questionnaire (Steyer
et al., 1997). Roughly 2 weeks after the experiment took place in the scanner,
the subjects also completed personality questionnaires that assessed their
general trust (M. Siegrist, C. Keller, T.C. Earle, and M. Hanselmann, personal
communication) and sensation seeking (Zuckerman, 1996; Zuckerman and
Link, 1968) behavior. The general trust scale is established using a ten-item
questionnaire, where general trust is defined as the conviction that most peo-
ple can be trusted most of the time. A person with a high level of general trust
assumes, in the absence of other information, that the other person will be
trustworthy. In other words, the general trust scale measures the general belief
in human benevolence. Strong positive correlation between this general trust
scale and an investor’s trusting behavior in a one-shot trust game with anon-
ymous partners is reported, whereas no such correlations were found in re-
peated trust games with the same partner or in one-shot games when partic-
ipants received information about their partner’s trustworthiness (M. Siegrist,
C. Keller, T.C. Earle, and M. Hanselmann, personal communication). To mea-
sure sensation seeking, we used the SSS-V developed by Zuckerman (Zucker-
man, 1996; Zuckerman and Link, 1968), which has proven validity and reliabil-
ity. The SSS-V consists of 40 questions divided into four subscales and one
complete scale. The four subscales measure subject’s motivation in engaging
in sports activities involving some physical danger or risk, the desire for unin-
hibited behavior in social situations, the desire to seek new experiences
through unconventional friends and travel, and the aversion to repetition of
any kind. The advantage of the delayed completion of the questionnaires is
twofold. First, the administered hormone does not influence the completion
of the questionnaires, and second, subjects were not aware that the comple-
tion of these questionnaireswas associated with the experiment in the scanner
and thus, carryover effects between the behavior in the experiment and the
questionnaires are highly unlikely.
fMRI Acquisition and Analysis
The experiment was conducted on a 3 Tesla Philips Intera whole body MR
Scanner (Philips Medical Systems) equipped with an eight-channel Philips
SENSE head coil. Structural image acquisition consisted of 180 T_1-weighted
transversal images (0.75 mm slice thickness). For functional imaging, a total of
310 volumes were obtained using a SENSitivity Encoded (SENSE [Pruess-
mann et al., 1999]) T2*-weighted echo-planar imaging sequence with an
acceleration factor of 2.0. 40 axial slices were acquired covering the whole
brain with a slice thickness of 3 mm; no interslice gap; interleaved acquisition;
TR = 3000ms; TE = 35ms; flip angle = 77; field of view = 220mm;matrix size =
80 3 80. In order to optimize functional sensitivity in orbitofrontal cortex and
medial temporal lobes, we used a tilted acquisition in an oblique orientation
at 30 to the AC-PC line.Neuron 58, 639–650, May 22, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 647
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mapping software package (SPM5, Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neu-
rology, London, UK) implemented in Matlab (Version 7) were used. For analy-
sis, all images were realigned to the first volume, corrected for motion artifacts
and time of acquisition within a TR, normalized (3 3 3 3 3 mm3) into standard
stereotaxic space (template provided by the Montreal Neurological Institute),
and smoothed using an 8 mm full-width-at-half-maximum Gaussian kernel.
A band-pass filter, which was composed of a discrete cosine-basis function
with a cutoff period of 128 s for the high-pass filter was applied. In order to
increase signal-to noise-ratio, global intensity changes were minimized by
scaling each image to the grand mean.
We performed random-effects analyses on the functional data for the deci-
sion phase. For that purpose, we defined a general linear model (GLM) that in-
cluded four regressors of interests and nine other regressors. The four regres-
sors of interests were modeled for the decision phase consisting of six
decision periods with onsets at the time of treatment screen appearance (six
trust periods prefeedback, six trust periods postfeedback, six risk periods pre-
feedback, and six risk periods postfeedback). Offsets of the decision phases
(regressor’s length) were individually modeled based on the subjects’ button
press. In addition, four regressors of noninterests weremodeled for thewaiting
epoch (duration 8 s) and four for the fixation time between decision and waiting
epoch (duration 4 s), again broken down for the two treatments (trust and risk
game) and two phases (prefeedback and postfeedback). Finally, another re-
gressor of noninterests modeled the three feedback periods (rudimentary
feedback after 12 periods, rudimentary feedback after the second 12 periods,
and full feedback after all 24 periods). All regressors were convolved with a
canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF). The six scan-to-scan
motion parameters produced during realignment were included as additional
regressors in the SPM analysis to account for residual effects of scan to
scan motion. The correction for multiple comparisons in whole-brain analyses
was carried out using an uncorrected p value of 0.005 combined with a cluster-
size threshold of 10 voxels (Forman et al., 1995). Furthermore, we focused in
our analyses on specific a priori defined regions of interests, in particular the
amygdala, midbrain regions and the caudate. Other brain regions, which are
significant at the same threshold, are also reported (see Tables 1 and 2). How-
ever, we are reluctant to make strong interpretations based on these results
because no a priori hypotheses have been made. In case of significant unilat-
eral activations in our main regions of interests, including amygdala and stria-
tum, we lowered the significance threshold to p < 0.01 (uncorrected) with the
same voxel extent to verify whether a bilateral activation pattern could be
found with this threshold.
Linear contrasts of regression coefficients were computed at the individual
subject level and then taken to a group level random effects analysis of vari-
ance. The following four different t contrast images were calculated for the
different analyses of the decision phase at the individual level using the four re-
gressors of interests: trust periods prefeedback > risk periods prefeedback,
trust periods postfeedback > risk periods postfeedback, risk periods prefeed-
back > trust periods prefeedback, and risk periods postfeedback > trust
periods postfeedback. For second-level random effects analysis, the single-
subject contrasts were entered into two two-way ANOVAs with the following
factors: ‘‘time phase’’ (prefeedback, postfeedback as a within subject factor)
and ‘‘group’’ (placebo, oxytocin as a between subject factor), and separately
for the single subjects contrasts trust > risk (prefeedback and postfeedback)
and risk > trust (prefeedback and postfeedback). Based on these ANOVAs,
we calculated the following eight serial subtraction contrasts, focusing on the
first four contrasts, based on our hypothesis of differential brain activation
patterns between OT and placebo in the trust and not risk game.
Trust Game
 OT group (trust prefeedback > risk prefeedback) > placebo group (trust
prefeedback > risk prefeedback)
 OT group (trust postfeedback > risk postfeedback) > placebo group
(trust postfeedback > risk postfeedback)
 Placebo group (trust prefeedback > risk prefeedback) > OT group (trust
prefeedback > risk prefeedback)
 Placebo group (trust postfeedback > risk postfeedback) > OT group
(trust postfeedback > risk postfeedback)648 Neuron 58, 639–650, May 22, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.Risk Game
 OT group (risk prefeedback > trust prefeedback) > placebo group (risk
prefeedback > trust prefeedback)
 OT group (risk postfeedback > trust postfeedback) > placebo group (risk
postfeedback > trust postfeedback)
 Placebo group (risk prefeedback > trust prefeedback) > OT group (risk
prefeedback > trust prefeedback)
 Placebo group (risk postfeedback > trust postfeedback) >OT group (risk
postfeedback > trust postfeedback)
All described serial subtraction terms were exclusively masked at p < 0.05
with the reversed second contrast of the serial subtraction term in order to
make sure that the observed differences between the two groups are not
due to differences in the reversed second contrast (Bermpohl et al., 2006).
We created ROIs using the MarsBaR software for all regions showing signif-
icant activations based on the described serial subtraction terms (depicted in
Tables 1 and 2), including our main regions of interests (amygdala, striatum,
midbrain regions and anterior cingulate cortex). ROIs for amygdala and stria-
tumwere defined by a combined functional and anatomical criterion by select-
ing all voxels in the anatomical brain regions (according to the anatomical atlas
of Tzourio-Mazoyer et al. [2002]) that were significantly (p < 0.01) activated in
the corresponding serial subtraction term (please see Table 2). In addition, we
created functional ROIs for all other brain regions by selecting all voxels that
were significantly activated at p < 0.005 in the corresponding serial subtraction
terms (please see Tables 1 and 2). Using these ROIs and the software package
SPSS (version 13), we conducted repeated-measures ANOVAs using partici-
pants’ mean beta weights to further investigate lateralization patterns and
time effects. In addition, we calculated repeated-measures and univariate
ANOVAs to control for potentially confounding variables that we used in the
analysis of investors’ choices and response times.
Behavioral and Psychometrical Analysis
For the behavioral data of the risk and trust game (transfer decisions), we first
created two trust and two risk indexes, consisting of the average transfer during
six trust or risk periods either played in the prefeedback or the postfeedback
phase. Using these four behavioral indexes, two two-way repeated-measures
ANOVAswere performed (separately for the trust and risk indexes) with the fol-
lowing factors: ‘‘time phase’’ (prefeedback, postfeedback as a within subject
factor) and ‘‘group’’ (placebo, OT as a between subject factor). We controlled
for general trust (M.Siegrist, C. Keller, T.C. Earle, andM.Hanselmann, personal
communication) and sensation seeking (Zuckerman and Link, 1968) scores
(using questionnaire measures described above) in these ANOVAs and for
the feedback information after the first six trust and six risk periods. We con-
trolled for these variables due to the following reasons. First, general trust
and sensation seeking have been shown to correlate positivelywith the trusting
behavior in trust games (Schechter, 2007; M. Siegrist, C. Keller, T.C. Earle, and
M. Hanselmann, personal communication). Second, because of an integer
problem, the reinforcement rate of 50% could imply slightly different feedback
information if the number of positive investment decisions (i.e., investments
greater than 0) were odd. In these cases, a random mechanism determined
whether to reinforce more or less than 50%. For example, if a subject invested
three times in the first six periods of the trust game, the subject received infor-
mation that the trustees repaid either in one of the three cases or in two of the
three trusting cases. On average, these differences in feedback information
cancel out (i.e., all treatments are affected in the sameway) butwenevertheless
control for these differences in our ANOVA’s to rule out any influence of this
feature of our experiments on our results.
For the psychometrical mood questionnaire (Steyer et al., 1997), a two-way
repeated-measures ANOVA was performed with the following factors: ‘‘time’’
(PreScan, before substance administration; PostScan, 10 min after the end of
the experiment; as a within subject factor) and ‘‘group’’ (placebo, OT, as a be-
tween subject factor). Finally, responses time differences (prefeedback and
postfeedback for the risk and trust game) as well as subjective rating scales
of the BIS were analyzed using independent t tests with group (OT, placebo)
as a between subject factor. Results were considered significant at the level
of p < 0.05 (two-tailed). In case of a significant multivariate effect, post hoc
Neuron
Oxytocin Shapes the Neural Circuitry of Trustpaired t tests were computed using the Bonferroni correction according to
Holm (1979). As effect size measure ETA2 is reported. Psychometrical and
behavioral analyses were performed using the statistical software package
SPSS 13 for PC (SPSS Inc.).
SUPPLEMENTAL DATA
The Supplemental Data for this article can be found online at http://www.
neuron.org/cgi/content/full/58/4/639/DC1/.
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